Colombia’s newly elected president, Abelardo de la Espriella, is a far-right millionaire who wishes to “disembowel” the left, a lawyer who claims to be an outsider in politics, and a champion of the fossil fuel industry. Unsurprisingly, he was endorsed by Donald Trump. De la Espriella’s victory in runoff elections this week, by a slender margin, marks the end of the four-year leftist government of Gustavo Petro, who raised the minimum wage, expanded the welfare net, and placed a moratorium on new oil exploration. Petro was enormously popular, but Colombia’s constitution did not allow him to run again. De la Espriella’s win marks a frightening resurgence of the right in a country that had been led by one of the most progressive governments in the Americas.

Petro’s erstwhile minister for the environment, Susana Muhamad, was instrumental in several of the government’s plans to battle the climate crisis. A political scientist with Palestinian roots, Muhamad spearheaded new policies to combat deforestation in the Amazon – which came down to historically low levels – and launched a $40 billion investment plan that could replace revenues from oil, gas and coal, which generate roughly 8% of the country’s GDP. Her initiatives led to the landmark Santa Marta conference in April: an invite-only event at which 57 countries discussed practical solutions for phasing out the production and use of fossil fuels, which Petro described as part of a “suicidal” model of capitalism. It was the kind of conversation that major oil and gas economies like the US and Saudi Arabia routinely block at COP and other climate conferences.

Muhamad has always argued that climate change is inextricably bound up in the systems of global power – specifically, in the nexus between corporations and right-wing governments. Other byproducts of this nexus include violence against communities in resource-rich regions, historic levels of economic inequality and militaristic states. We spoke to Muhamad about how De la Espriella might impact Petro’s progressive green policies, and the playbook for how midsized countries can tackle the climate crisis.

Samanth Subramanian: Abelardo’s victory has caused great alarm among many people on the left, including climate activists. And it probably came as a surprise for people outside Colombia, since Petro left office with such a high approval rating, and the progressives had considerable momentum through this election process. What’s your analysis of why Abelardo won despite that?

Susana Muhamad: There are many factors. The difference was roughly 250,000 votes. Of these, roughly 168,000 were cast by Colombians from overseas, mostly in the US – a new factor in our elections. Additionally, we had a campaign that took time to gain traction in the first round, and got the momentum that we needed only by the second. But crucially, compared with [the last election] four years ago this year, the right decided to unite behind a single candidate.

Of course, we have to analyse all this more carefully. This was the highest voter turnout in Colombian history, so we have to see where those new votes came from. But it is a legacy of Petro’s government that Colombian society has become more politically aware and willing to participate in the democratic space – even if, in the end, it also strengthened our opposition.

I feel frustrated because it was a very tiny margin, but we don’t feel defeated. We’ve grown in force compared with 2022.

How much did Donald Trump’s endorsement of Abelardo influence the result?

I think it was more the right’s capacity to rally Colombians abroad, who tend to have more conservative values, especially in places like Miami and Houston that are driven by the logic of the American dream: migrants go abroad, work hard and prosper. Remember, lots of Latinos ended up voting for Trump despite the pressure he promised to put on migration.

What does the election of Abelardo mean for Colombia’s efforts to fight the climate crisis – for the plan to transition away from fossil fuels that you and Petro put together, for instance, or for the fight to prevent deforestation?

The most dangerous proposal involves his policy on fracking, because that will expand the extractivist industry in Colombia and create a further dependence on fossil fuels. Next is the coming rush for minerals, many of which are in biodiversity hotspots that are critical for our climate balance. Our main contribution to the fight against climate change is to stop deforestation and changes to land use. But the new government’s policy will be to get Colombia into the business of exporting minerals like copper and rare earths, especially to the US. I think that’s the main reason why Trump supported Abelardo – to secure access to those resources.

Apart from being rich in biodiversity, these mining sites are also high in cultural diversity. I foresee a lot of social conflict being triggered by these policies, and that could translate into violence. This is completely contrary to our vision to use biodiversity to create “peace with nature”, as we called it during COP 16. We wanted to create economic opportunities from biodiversity and empower local communities against international crime. A harsh extractivist policy will do the opposite.

I assume Abelardo’s election dooms Colombia’s participation in the Santa Marta initiatives?

Well, if his policy is to frack and to extract oil and gas, it would be very hypocritical for Colombia to claim it wants to lead a phaseout of fossil fuels.

Given the legacy of Petro’s government, did the environment turn out to be a major issue with voters?

During the second round, fracking became one of the top three issues. That hadn’t happened before, meaning that the Colombian population is more sensitive now to environmental concerns. It makes me think that when Abelardo’s government starts its big extractive industry, they will meet a lot of resistance.

I should point out that even Abelardo was forced to put forward some kind of environmental policy. In fact, that was the only policy he put forward in detail. There’s an interesting phenomenon in Colombia: even on the right, no single party denies climate change. Even right-wing presidents have traditionally wanted to show results on that front. Abelardo’s policy had all the right words, but totally contradicted his plan to go deeper into extractivism. The agenda is divided: “We’ll protect what is already protected, like sanctuaries, but the rest we will exploit”.

We suffer a lot of environmental crime, including deforestation, losing 174,000 hectares every year [in 2021, the year before Petro came to power]. The main strategy of earlier governments was to use military force – and that doesn’t work. We proved that. What is effective is working with communities and their economies, while tackling international crime. My worry is that because Abelardo has been a lawyer for the mafia, he will not go against big money – or against the organised crime that perpetuates illegal mining and deforestation. As a government, you have to ask: “Who has the capacity to invest 5 billion pesos into [industrial activity in] the Amazon?” You have to look into how the army, the police, politicians, drug lords and money-laundering racketeers are all mixed up in this. My worry is that this government will instead target the weakest links: the peasants and informal miners.

This is also, in a way, Trump’s policy. I am very worried about Abelardo’s subordination to the Trump administration, and how that might drive human rights abuses. We’re a country that is number one in the murders of land defenders and environmental activists. I think this violence will only increase.

I was reading about your career and it surprised me that you had, at one point, worked for Shell Global Solutions…

I joined Shell as a graduate, to work in sustainability. This was around 2002-2003. At the time, they were running a big campaign – greenwashing, as it turned out – claiming they were going to become an energy company rather than a fossil fuel company. I thought it was a powerful idea that you could change the energy system through these corporations.

So I joined a team responsible for making environmental, health and social assessments related to projects in the planning phase. I had the opportunity to travel and see operations in Iran, Nigeria and Qatar, and be on the ground with the communities there. I even joined an innovation team to present sustainable project ideas. Shell’s operations are so huge that you could have a corner that was totally sustainable on its own. But then they decided that their innovation budgets were going into non-conventional fossil fuels like tar sands and fracking, and it became clear to me that this was all just greenwashing. I resigned.

Could you tell me about what you saw from inside the fossil fuel industry, which influenced your ideas about sustainability and also about the possibility of phasing out fossil fuels?

I learned a lot about the logic and geopolitical business of fossil fuels. As an intern in the CEO’s office, I saw presidents, royals and immense political power passing through. How the company behaved with governments in the Global South versus those in the North – it was like Shell was two different companies. In Nigeria, corruption was justified, and executives would go out all night to pick up Nigerian women – this would never be accepted in Europe. I saw ethical issues, scandals and their true mindset towards development.

What do you mean? Could you give me an example?

I remember visiting a fishing village in the Niger Delta. It’s like the Colombian Pacific: there’s incredible biodiversity. The manager of the project told me that these people were very poor, and that we were bringing development. In my mind, though, I thought: “These people are not poor. They’re healthy, they fish for a living, they have their customs.” But we came there with the Nigerian army, supposedly for our protection, and the villagers came out with bands of white cloth, asking for peace. And I was thinking: “Who are the violent people here? We’re the ones coming here with weapons, intending to survey their territory and totally transform their lives in the name of development.” For me, that was clearly upside-down. No one could convince me that we were bringing jobs and money that would improve their lives.

Your mention of the logic of this power reminded me of how, when Petro’s government suspended coal exports to Israel during the Gaza genocide, that move of solidarity was met with challenge after challenge from corporations, other governments and their nexus on the right. How does the global far right fight climate action, even as its own legitimacy is dwindling?

Well, basically it’s fossil fuel and new technology capital trying to sustain the heart of a crumbling capitalist system. It's crumbling because of the environmental crisis and historic inequality. This is also the fault of liberal governments that weren’t able to bring the people with them, leaving them vulnerable to the populist far right. But the fossil fuel and technology industries are monopolising the world’s resource base.

That’s why there is this tremendous paralysis in the world against atrocities, like the Gaza genocide. That’s why it’s so hard to stand up as an international community against the abuses of Israel and the US. In fact, only a few countries have stood up – like the Hague group of 13 countries, which includes Colombia. On the other hand, you see European countries watch their citizens fight for the freedom of Gaza, for humanitarian aid and basic human rights, but their governments are so paralysed in the face of Israel that they cannot mobilise.

So for Colombia to lead by example and suspend coal exports was a very powerful thing to do, even in the face of difficult consequences. But this is reversing now: we’re going to have a government that will align itself with American and Israeli interests. We will probably resume our diplomatic relationship with Israel and start selling them coal again. And worse than that, the Israeli government and Colombia used to have military deals; Israel trained paramilitary groups here in the 1980s responsible for so many massacres. So that’s very frightening, as the threat of political revenge grows in a world of high impunity.

How specifically do these corporate and far-right forces combine to challenge something like the Santa Marta conference? What are the weapons at their disposal?

You know, when you’re in climate talks at COP, a country like Saudi Arabia with deep fossil fuel interests will block entire negotiations. But with them, you know what you’re dealing with. Same with the US.

The Santa Marta conference was a process to bring together like-minded countries intent on a transition away from fossil fuels, and to put other issues on the table – not in the COP’s negotiation format, but just to be able to talk. I think it was successful, partly because it was by invitation only, so we didn’t have those blockers.

But I was surprised by the Europeans, and how they started using the same tired diplomatic mechanisms to take the power away from the conference. It’s very subtle how they polarise the issue. They’ll say, “All this discussion is wonderful… But we cannot have a binding agreement. That’s the convention.” Which takes us back to a mechanism that is designed to fail, because it gives power to anyone who vetoes. And the fossil fuel interests will always trigger a veto on real efforts to phase out those fuels.

So a little bit of that poison crept in, and I was wondering: why? The main discussion we intended to have was about debt, international commerce, and how to balance supply and demand. But the discourse became all about how this conference couldn’t produce a new, binding treaty. It overshadowed all the efforts of civil society to bring ideas to governments for the first time.

Everyone looks to China as the model of the energy transition, but maybe it’s more realistic to look to Colombia as a model of how you can wean yourself off fossil fuels without the kind of unique, world-historic conditions you have in China. So what advice would you have for how other middle-income, commodity-dependent countries can pursue a climate transition?

It needs a very strong social base of support, and the policies have to be radically inclusive, which means that you bring with you the people who are most vulnerable in society. That is the first priority. The population has to see, in the transition, a process towards a new reality that will leave them better off.

The second thing is: you need a new international coalition. And it has to be economic, not environmental. The environment is the consequence; the driver of the problem is economic. So we should have new economic agreements that make the transition possible. It’s very difficult for any country in our position to make this transition alone. You can start to a certain degree, but you need to build a bloc to develop the political capacity to influence international mechanisms.

That’s what Colombia was pursuing, with more or less success. But my worry is that now, this right-wing government will want to pursue the opposite policy through military means. That's why it changes the correlation of power within society. We could win this game democratically – but if power and military might block those means, then I’m very, very pessimistic about our chances.