Rivals

Iza Ding

Interviewed by Gavin Jacobson 

21.11.2026Conversation

Over the past week, as scandal engulfed the AI boom’s leading figure, the Western press deployed its familiar repertoire of geopolitical melodrama: boardroom intrigue, suspected espionage, and a superpower rivalry in the balance.

Columnists seized on former Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang’s affair as proof of Beijing’s covert reach into the commanding heights of American capitalism, and fretted over the security of Silicon Valley’s technological edge. In Beijing and Taipei, commentators read the uproar as another instance of containment and a reminder that even the most celebrated figures of the Asian diaspora remain hostage to great power politics. Both reactions share the compulsion to reduce national competition to a morality play, as if the trajectory of Sino-American rivalry turns on private indiscretion.

For a cooler assessment of what is actually at stake, Equator turned to Iza Ding, one of the most insightful scholars of modern China. Ding is the author of The Performative State, a singular study of bureaucratic governance and policy-making in China, as well as many influential essays on statecraft. We discussed the competing narratives around the Huang affair, the limits of Beijing’s foreign intelligence reach, how Chinese tech firms navigate the demands of state rules and commercial self-interest, and why Western fixations on espionage elide the history of China’s industrial ascent.

Gavin Jacobson: Everyone seems to have their own account of what the Jensen Huang affair really means – for Silicon Valley, AI, Washington and Beijing. What do you think is most significant about this moment, and what does the reaction itself tell us?

Iza Ding: What’s most striking about the public reaction is its sheer intensity. The story landed at a moment of peak collective anxiety over great-power rivalry, AI disruptions, billionaire power and national security. With the facts unsettled, everyone filled the void with their own preoccupations.

Many Asian Americans in tech saw Jensen Huang as one of the very few to break through corporate America’s “bamboo ceiling”. He did it by building the company that powered America’s AI boom, only to be discarded at the first whiff of scandal. For Chinese immigrants, the coverage evokes all those times they’ve been asked, however jokingly, whether they spy for the CCP. Mainland Chinese social media is filled with sympathy for Huang, while Taiwan is mourning a hometown hero.

Others see their priors confirmed. Trump critics see the White House putting personal interests above the national interest. China hawks in both parties feel vindicated in their warnings about Chinese espionage. And Beijing sees further proof of the importance of technological sovereignty.

The speed with which everyone jumped to their own verdict says less about what actually happened and more about our collective anxieties – and our waning trust in the legacy media.

When a Chinese national comes under scrutiny, commentators often cite the National Intelligence Law as proof that Beijing can compel anyone to spy for them on command. What does Beijing actually ask of its citizens abroad? And can the National Intelligence Law help us understand the Huang affair?

When the scandal first broke, headlines labelled Alice Huang a spy or “alleged spy” – a label her gender and nationality made easy to accept. Once that theory hit some bumps, the argument shifted – it doesn’t matter if she was a spy or not, because China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law legally obliges all citizens to assist with intelligence work, which makes every Chinese citizen abroad a potential intelligence asset. While some have pointed out that Article 7 carries no penalty, others argue that because China is an authoritarian regime, it can coerce any citizen into intelligence gathering.

But if the assumption is that China can dragoon any citizen into intelligence gathering, the National Intelligence Law would have made no substantive difference. If the CCP had wanted to coerce its citizens abroad, it could have done so without any such law.

And for most overseas Chinese, there is no intelligence of interest to gather, and they will never meet an MSS agent. Alice Huang’s case is obviously different, given that she was reported to be in a relationship with the CEO of Nvidia. It’s entirely plausible that Chinese intelligence took an interest in her or even approached her. But whether she actually passed on sensitive information is a question for an independent investigation. The National Intelligence Law alone tells us nothing about this case.

Western commentary often assumes that Chinese citizens and Chinese businesses march in lockstep with their government. Your book The Performative State explores the gap between Chinese policies and their implementation. How does that friction help explain why Chinese firms keep finding ways around the rules, Beijing’s included, to get hold of Nvidia chips? How to tell a commercial hustle from a state-directed operation?

It’s logically and logistically impossible for 1.4 billion people to march in lockstep. If they did, China’s economy would not have developed in the way it has. Much of China’s growth happened precisely because people worked around government rules while Beijing kept “one eye open, one eye closed.” Until 1988, a private business could legally hire no more than seven people (Marx said eight workers made you a capitalist). Many private entrepreneurs simply registered their firms as collectives to hire more people, a practice known as “wearing a red hat”. The state noticed, but instead of punishing private businesses, it changed the constitution in 1988 to legalise them, because it realised that private firms were the engine of economic development.

We’re seeing a similar dynamic with chips. Publicly traded Chinese tech firms are under pressure from shareholders to produce short-term profits. For them, Nvidia chips or training models in Southeast Asia are elements of rational business. The state discouraged it, but it’s unlikely that they were absolutely unaware that it was happening. However, the state isn’t of one mind. Regulators and industry ministries are pushing firms to ditch Nvidia chips for domestic ones, while the Ministry of Commerce probably cares more about keeping trade flowing. So commercial hustle and state direction coexist. In this case, different parts of the state probably want to go in different directions, as they do in the American government.

At the end of the day, firms are motivated by profit. There is nothing uniquely Chinese about corporate hustling or governments meddling in strategic industries. Chinese AI companies bypassed chip rules through legal loopholes for the same reason Apple and Google parked their intellectual property in Ireland. And when the EU ordered Apple to pay its back taxes, the Obama Treasury took Apple’s side. The American government takes substantial equity stakes in domestic rare earth and lithium mines. Still, minerals that China banned for export to the US have been making their way into the US through Thailand and Mexico.

In your work on “restorative nationalism”, you examine how anxieties over status loss fuel political narratives of victimhood. The Western obsession with “Chinese spies” often seems to suggest a deeper anxiety about its own decline. To what extent does attributing China’s rise to espionage recast economic and technological competition as something more sinister – and avoid reckoning with the realities of how China actually developed?

For countries that can’t pump wealth out of the ground, economic development generally follows a familiar arc. Step one involves mobilisation and investment; step two, adopting existing technology; and step three, scalable innovation. “Scalable” is the key word. The Soviet Union put the first man into space, which did little for the Soviet economy, because normal people don’t take trips into space. When we think of scalable innovation we think of the steam engine, the light bulb, the internet, microchips and batteries.

There’s no mystery to how China’s economy got here. China escaped poverty through agricultural reform and manufacturing and export, eventually becoming a middle-income country. But not every country can break out of the “middle-income trap”, which requires making high-end goods and selling them to rich markets. Japan and South Korea both achieved it with significant help from Washington, which tolerated cheap licensing and opened access to US consumers.

But America’s fear isn’t that China will escape the middle-income trap; it’s that China will knock the US from the number one spot. It’s completely natural, if not always rational, for number one to fear the rise of number two and to want to secure its position – just ask Sascha Zverev. In the 1980s, when Japan, its economy growing fast, took the lead in the memory-chip market, Washington pushed through the Plaza Accord to drive up the yen, set price floors for Japanese chips, and slapped 100% tariffs on Japanese electronics. Japan’s economy peaked at about 70% of America’s and has stagnated since. China reached that mark in 2020, so it’s no surprise Washington is running the same playbook.

Jensen Huang’s idea was to make China dependent on American chips so it wouldn’t develop domestic capacity – a convenient view that made him a lot of money. China hawks in Washington want to cut China off entirely – also a predictable stance. But to sell such a drastic policy to the public, you need a strong moral argument, so China’s rise is presented as tech theft.

Does industrial espionage happen? Of course. That’s partly how American manufacturing took off. In 1789, Samuel Slater memorised British textile machine designs and moved to the US at a time when Britain had banned the export of machinery and the emigration of skilled workers. Alexander Hamilton wanted to reward people who did this.

But the bulk of technology transfer happens through learning, which any well-educated population can do. The rest happens through trade, licensing and joint ventures. Sony got its big break by licensing the transistor from an American firm for $25,000. China, for its part, leveraged access to its vast markets to acquire some of its technology – often requiring foreign firms to form joint ventures with Chinese partners as part of the admission price. The tables are now turning: the EU is drafting rules that would force Chinese EV and battery makers into joint ventures with European partners. Ironically, many of China’s homegrown breakthroughs happened outside these joint ventures – BYD developed its core technology in-house.

Right now, the hawks have mostly gotten their way. Between Nvidia halting shipments and new rules barring Chinese firms from renting Nvidia chips at data centers in Southeast Asia without US approval, Beijing is more convinced Washington is trying to strangle its tech sector regardless of who is in the White House. That’s why it was already nudging Chinese firms away from Nvidia chips well before this scandal broke – much to the firms’ chagrin.

Whether China can break out of this American chokehold comes down to two things: incentive and capacity. As long as Chinese AI firms could get their hands on far superior Nvidia chips (Huawei’s best chip still lags behind a 2022 Nvidia model), they had little reason to buy domestically. Now that those loopholes are closing, the buyer’s incentive has emerged, and the question becomes one of capacity. China’s AI sector is heading into a temporary winter, and it will only thaw if Huawei and SMIC, the company that manufactures its chips, can manufacture high-end chips at scale. The difficult question for China is how to keep Huawei sharp with a captive market.

Ultimately, China’s economic development isn’t some dark anomaly. It followed the same blueprint as every other success case: invest heavily, acquire foreign tech by learning, buying, licensing or stealing it, and eventually push for homegrown innovation. The espionage angle gives some in Washington a moral argument to double down on export controls right when US-China relations had appeared to be warming.

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